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Tactical Air Power 
in Normandy 
Some Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan. 
Robert Vogel 
T he Allied campaign in North-West Europe in 1944-45 ended with the capitulation 
of the German Army and must, therefore, be 
considered an eminently successful operation. 
In its initial phase, that is the assault on 
Normandy and the securing of a defensible 
lodgement area, it was undoubtedly one of 
the most dangerous and complicated 
operations of the war. Nevertheless it ended 
as the victory which marked the beginning of 
the end of the Third Reich. Like many other 
campaigns, however, it did not go exactly as 
planned and many have claimed that the 
Allied Armies were neither properly trained 
nor adequately led and that, therefore, some 
other element ensured the victory. The 
overwhelming power of the Allied air force 
and its effects on the operations ofthe German 
Army has been the favourite theme of both 
historians 1 and the German generals. 2 This 
powerful combination has long dominated 
the assessment ofthe campaign. It is not the 
purpose of this essay to minimize the 
importance of Allied air operations, in 
particular the attacks on the German 
communication system. Rather, it is an 
attempt to examine in some detail the actual 
results of that operation in order to obtain a 
clearer understanding of its place among the 
many other ingredients which combined to 
defeat the German Army in Normandy. 
The prerequisites for an Allied victory 
were simple in theory but difficult in execution. 
"In war," Hindenburg said "only the simple 
succeeds." These simple things included the 
need to breach the Atlantic Wall quickly, the 
establishment of a lodgment area secure 
enough to ensure the safe arrival of essential 
supplies and a reinforcement rate which would 
more than match the German ability to bring 
troops to Normandy. In the event all three 
prerequisites were fulfilled, but the reasons 
for this success have caused considerable 
debate. Which of the many Allied stratagems 
to ensure victory had been the most 
successful, quite apart, of course, from the 
actual fighting on the ground? Was it the 
deception plan with regard to a possible 
second landing in the Pas de Calais area, the 
actions of the French Resistance, the 
information provided by Ultra or Allied air 
superiority? Or perhaps it was those factors 
over which the Western Allies had no control 
such as the timing of the Russian Summer 
Offensive [June 22nd] and the collapse of 
army Group Centre, the quarrel between 
Rundstedt and Rommel over the disposition 
of the German Armour, the failure of OKW to 
release the German reserve the list is long 
and each has had some earnest advocates. 
But most have argued that the chief 
ingredient for Allied success was the actions 
of the Allied air forces, particularly the tactical 
support offered to the Allied armies. In order 
to understand the role played by the tactical 
use of air power, the objectives of Allied air 
power must be classified into a variety of 
specific aims, some of which had to be 
completed before D-Day. The first, and the 
one regarded as absolutely essential for all 
operations connected with Neptune, was the 
winning of air superiority over the battlefield. 
This task proved easier than expected and 
there can be no doubt that throughout the 
campaign the Luftwaffe played a very minor 
role despite the attractive targets offered by 
the concentration of Allied shipping. It should 
be remembered, however, that the winning of 
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Destruction wrought by the Allied Air Forces at a rail yard in France. 
air superiority was really accomplished in the 
long and costly fight waged by Bomber 
Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force 
during the winter of 1943-4, so that by the 
spring of 1944, the German fighter forces 
were virtually helpless in the face of 
overwhelming Allied air power. Nevertheless, 
the Allied air forces devoted considerable 
effort to attacking German airfields and 
Luftwaffe installations generally in the period 
before and during the invasion. The high 
price which was paid by the Allied air forces 
during the operations in the spring were 
exacted largely by the effectiveness of the 
German anti-aircraft defenses. 
38 
(CFPU PL 32257) 
The second objective was the disruption 
ofthe French railway network so that German 
supplies and reinforcements would not be 
able to take advantage of this efficient 
transportation system. This operation, over 
which there was a great deal of Allied 
controversy, was carried out largely by heavy 
bombers and there is still considerable debate 
about whether the plan was altogether 
successful. 3 
The third task was the almost 
continuous attack on German coastal 
batteries and defense positions along the 
coastline, an aspect of the pre-Neptune 
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A reconnaissance flight over the Normandy beaches on 6 May 1944 catches German troops scrambling for cover. 
Detailed information on the beach defences was obtained .from "dicing" shots like this one. Timber ramps, with 
mines or saw-toothed blades to take out the bottoms of landing craft, are clearly visible. 
operations which has received relatively little 
attention from the historians. 4 Targets in 
this group included the major radar stations, 
a particularly important element of the 
German defenses because the Luftwaffe had 
lost most of its reconnaissance capability. 
The radar installations were especially difficult 
targets because they were among the most 
heavily defended. The bombardment 
increased in intensity until finally on the 
night of June 5-6th, the Allied air forces were 
used to saturate the German defenses and 
radar installations on and immediately beyond 
the proposed landing sites. 
(U.S. Air Force Photo 57357 A. C.) 
Fourthly, the Allied air forces carried 
out a continuous reconnaissance over the 
whole of Western Europe, particularly over 
the areas of the German Seventh and Fifteenth 
Armies. Nor does that complete the activities 
of the Allied air forces. Coastal Command 
carried out mine-laying and harassment 
operations which effectively neutralized the 
remnants of the German Naval forces on the 
west coast of France and Belgium. This 
effort, on the part of one of the smaller Allied 
commands, involved more than 5,000 sorties 
in the period of April-May 1944. 
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It must be added that the Allied air 
forces also carried out a number of other 
operations, some of which, like the attacks on 
the German V1 and V2 installations, were 
regarded as being of almost equal importance 
to the operations in preparation forD-Day. 
The attack on this group of targets, known as 
Operation "Crossbow," was designed to 
prevent the German V -weapons from 
becoming a serious danger in the summer of 
1944. As well as carrying on this complicated 
series of operations, Bomber Command, as 
well as the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air 
Forces continued to bomb Germany, making 
substantial raids on a variety of targets. 
The air commanders had always 
emphasized the flexibility of their forces and 
certainly in this period this was well illustrated 
by the fact that the Allied air forces were 
obedient to so many different directives and 
target selection systems. Statistics are useful 
only in the sense that they provide some 
concept of the enormous scope of these 
operations and the high casualties which the 
Allied air forces sustained. More than 200,000 
sorties were flown in this preparatory period 
and about 200,000 tons ofbombs dropped on 
targets in France and Germany. The cost was 
high, about 2,000 Allied aircraft were shot 
down resulting in the loss of more than 12,000 
men. 
Once the Allies were ashore, the task of 
the tactical air forces was the maintenance of 
air superiority, the continuation of the attempt 
to isolate the battlefield and the use of aircraft 
to strike at tactical targets as required by the 
Army. Again there is little dispute about the 
fact that the Allied air forces were largely 
successful in keeping the Luftwaffe away 
from the battlefield - "If it's white, it's 
American, if it's black, it's British, if you can't 
see it, it's the Luftwaffe" is how the German 
soldiers described the situation. The more 
difficult questions relate to the extent to 
which air power managed to "isolate" the 
battlefield and how far the air forces managed 
to provide effective tactical support for the 
armies. This essay will attempt only to address 
the first of these problems. 
40 
The controversy which surrounds the 
whole question of attacking the French railway 
system is well known and needs little re-
telling. The problems were manifold. There 
was first of all the question of whether the 
transportation network in France was so dense 
that the bombing could not really prevent it 
from supplying the basic needs ofthe German 
Army. 5 There were secondly the hesitations 
of Churchill with respect to the number of 
French civilian casualties which the bombing 
was bound to entail. There was also the fear 
that the bombing pattern would reveal the 
intended Allied landing site and that therefore 
the attempt to isolate the battlefield should 
wait until the day of the actual landing. The 
other side ofthat particular argument against 
the interdiction plan was of course that to 
wait until the last day would mean that 
everything would depend on the weather; bad 
weather during the first week of the invasion 
would make it virtually impossible to carry 
out the necessary air strikes. And indeed the 
weather during the second and third days of 
the invasion severely inhibited the operations 
of the air forces. The whole controversy was 
not resolved until April 14th when Eisenhower 
was finally given the "direction of the strategic 
air forces in support of Overlord." From that 
date onwards the plan to "interdict" the French 
transportation network on a massive scale 
began. The main objective was to inflict 
sufficient damage to that network so that the 
Germans would not be able to reinforce their 
troops in Normandy more quickly than the 
Allies could reinforce theirs. 
The major difficulty in assessing the 
success of the "interdiction" operation lies in 
the complicated nature of the German 
response to the landings in Normandy. The 
German Command reacted with great caution, 
believing that the Allies were capable of 
undertaking at least one other major assault 
on the coast of northern France, most 
particularly, in the area of the Pas de Calais. 
Therefore the plan, known as "Case 3", for 
immediately reinforcing the Seventh Army 
with a second Army Command, 5 corps and 
10 divisions [six of which would have come 
from the Fifteenth Army's Reserve] was 
apparently never even considered. 6 
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The immediate response to the Allied 
landings was to provide support from within 
Seventh Army. The II Parachute Corps, with 
77th, 265th, 275th7 and 3rd Parachute 
Divisions were dispatched to the western side 
of the landings. The 346th Infantry Division 
from Fifteenth Army reserve, the only unit to 
be transferred from Fifteenth Army, was sent 
to the extreme eastern side of the landing 
area. The armoured divisions - 12th SS 
Panzer, 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr - with 
their appropriate Corps as well as the 
Headquarters of Panzer Group West and the 
LXXXI Army Corps and the III Flak Corps 
were made available and the 17th SS Panzer 
Grenadier Division was released from south 
of the Loire. 8 At the same time, however, 
Fifteenth Army received two divisions, one 
from Norway, the 89th and one from Denmark, 
the 363rd, as well as having two new ones 
created in its area, the 6th Parachute and 
Right: A gun camera photo of a German convoy being 
strafed by a P-47 Thunderbolt from the Ninth 
U.S. Air Force. (U.S. Army Photo) 
Below: A group of Canadian officers watching Hawker 
Typhoons of 121 Squadron, RAF taking off 
(NAC PA 116725) 
41 
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l36th Infantry. It also lost the 19th Panzer 
Division to Army Group Centre in Russia and 
the 19th Luftwaffe Field Division to Army 
Group C in Italy. This was a considerable 
amount of seemingly unnecessary movement 
on a devastated railway system. 
The question remains how far the 
tactical air forces interfered with all these 
movements and how far the battlefield can be 
considered to have been "isolated." The 
experiences of the arriving troops with regard 
to delays because of the unavailability of rail 
transport and attacks from the tactical air 
force vary greatly. The infantry that arrived 
from Brittany which was, in any case, not 
mechanically mobile, except for bicycles, 
managed to arrive on the battlefront within 
two or three days. The l 7th SS Panzer 
Grenadier Division, although strung out on 
the roads, was ready to be committed on the 
8th but changing orders from Rommel seemed 
to have delayed its actual commitment and as 
a result, it arrived at the front in scattered 
units. Units of the lst U.S. Infantry Division 
were in contact with the l 7th SS as early as 
the lOth June. 
The armour which was released on the 
first day- 12th SS and Panzer Lehr - came 
by road and suffered, by their accounts, 
relatively few casualties on the march. 9 The 
vanguard of the SS Division was held up 
largely because when it was ordered west of 
Caen, the roads through the city were 
considered unsuitable and it had to make its 
way around the city. Nevertheless during the 
following day, the 25th Panzer Regiment, 
supported by some tanks, launched a series 
of attacks on the advanced regiments of the 
3rd Canadian Infantry Division. The second 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the 26th, was in 
action the following day. 10 
The III Flak Corps moved up, largely by 
road and was ready to participate in the 
counterattack of the ISS Panzer Corps on the 
llth. Its commander, Pickert, claimed that 
the movement was carried out with no 
casualties or damage. 11 
The Panzer Lehr Division, stationed 
about 113 kilometres from the front, began to 
42 
move on the morning of the 7th (or late on the 
6th). Its advanced units were in the line on 
the morning of the 8th, but the armour and 
much of its other equipment would not close 
up for another 24 hours. Still it reported few 
losses in transit although there were delays 
and arguments about whether it should move 
during daylight hours, which in fact it did. 12 
The 2nd Panzer Division had much 
further to go; its headquarters was at 
Abbeville, although the Division was strung 
out along the valley of the Somme. It was 
ordered to the Front on the 9th June and 
made its way via Paris. Some of its motorized 
units were south ofCaumont on the 12th but 
its tanks were strung out as far back as Paris. 
The Division was fully engaged by the 18th. 
Luttwitz, its Commander, complained about 
delays and inadequate transport but does not 
report any actual damage or loss. 13 
The l 0 l Heavy Tank Battalion of the I 
SS Panzer Corps moved by road from Beauvais 
about 70 kilometres north-west of Paris during 
the night of 6-7th June. Its third company 
and its Repair and Recovery Unit were badly 
damaged by an air attack in a wood near 
Versailles on the following night but the lst 
and 2nd Companies were fighting near Villers-
Bocage on June 13th, as the British 7th 
Armoured Division discovered to its regret. 14 
The experiences of the various divisions 
ordered to the front, therefore, appear to have 
varied greatly and this situation does not 
seem to have changed in the second half of 
June or July. The 276th Infantry Division, 
for instance, was ordered from the south of 
France on June 15th and was in the line five 
days later. Badinsky, its commander, reported 
no difficulties in transit. 15 On the other hand, 
the l st SS Panzer Division ordered from 
Zwanestrand, northeast of Antwerp on June 
17th, did not have its infantry in place until 
the 28th and its tanks until a week later. 
Nevertheless its commander, Wisch, claimed 
that it had sustained no damage during 
transit. 16 Like the 2nd SS Panzer Division it 
carried out anti-guerrilla operations in a 
seemingly unhurried move to the frontY 
6
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These photos 
show the 
effect of 
Allied air 
power on 
German 
transport 
during the 
closing of the 
Falaise Gap. 
Photos taken 
on 20Augusi 
1944. 
(U.S. Air 
Force 
Photos A & 
B-54338 
A. C.) 
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The II SS Panzer Corps crossed all of 
Europe from Lemerg to Normandy between 
June 11th and 28th, although some of its 
advance units, such as its Heavy Tank 
Battalion, 102, were already at the front on 
the 22nd. Despite the fact that Ultra had 
pinpointed the whereabouts of the large 
number of trains required for the move of the 
two armoured divisions and their general 
unloading areas, it seems that most of the 
men and material arrived safely in 
Normandy. 18 The same appears to have been 
true for the various other divisions which 
were moving across France at the same time 
(353rd, 266th, 16th GAF and 6th Parachute); 
even the crossing ofthe Seine appears to have 
been manageable. The 346th Infantry Division 
crossed on 8-9 June to reinforce the extreme 
left wing of the 7th Army. 19 When the reserves 
of the Fifteenth Army were finally released in 
the middle of July, some of the units crossed 
the Seine southwards. 
Clearly no one can say how much faster 
German troops would have arrived without 
the transportation plan and the continuing 
harassment from the air. It is fairly clear, 
however, that the failure to provide rapid 
reinforcement to Normandy was caused by 
many factors of which air power was only one. 
The most important "other" factor was surely 
the hesitation with which the German 
Command handled the situation. It was not 
prepared to give ground in Normandy, not 
even to make the most elementary adjustment 
in its line to get the German troops out of 
range of the Allied naval guns, which time 
and again interfered with German 
concentrations or made pin-point strikes 
against German positions. Moreover the 
continuing belief, as much self-delusion as 
Allied deception, that a second landing in 
northern France was imminent, forced the 
German Command to bring troops from as far 
away as Norway and southern France and 
leave the strong Fifteenth Army virtually 
intact. 
It has also been argued that the effect of 
air power on the movement of supplies, was of 
major importance, but in the field of logistics 
there are still more factors to be considered. 
On a "normal" battle day in June, Seventh 
44 
Army, which controlled the supply system for 
all units at the front, including Panzer Group 
West, said it needed 3200 tonnes of transport 
space, roughly divided into 500 tonnes for 
supply, 1200 for ammunition and 1500 cbm. 
for POL [petrol, oil and lubricants]; if an 
attack was to be launched both ammunition 
and POL needed to increase to 1500 tonnes 
and 2500 cbm. respectively. During this 
period, however, Seventh Army claimed that 
it rarely had more than 1300 tonnes of total 
transport capacity available with the result 
that ammunition and fuel were usually in 
short supply on the German side. 20 The 
Allies, on the other hand, while they did 
suffer occasional shortages, were able with 
their air forces and navies to protect their 
supply system so well that only the storm of 
June 18-19th really placed them in an 
unusually difficult position. The question 
remains whether this chronic shortage on the 
German side was caused by the actions of the 
Allied air forces or by the lack of German 
motor transport and the general shortages of 
fuel which were beginning to be felt everywhere 
within German control. Clearly, the actions 
of the tactical air forces did not ease the 
German supply problems but, conversely, 
these problems did not prevent the German 
Army from fighting a long and bitter campaign 
in Normandy. 21 
Can any clear conclusion be reached in 
this situation? The battle of Normandy was 
full of anomalies and neither Montgomery 
nor Rommel shone in this campaign. Each 
appears to have tried the tactics which had 
made the other famous - Montgomery 
attempting to break through the German 
defenses with narrow spearheads of tanks, 
which brought high cost failures in June and 
July while Rommel conducted a campaign of 
static attrition, perhaps perforce, using his 
tanks in order to hold the line, while much of 
the Army Group B infantry sat north of the 
Seine. This situation, over which the two 
commanders perhaps had less control than 
they might have wished, brought high 
casualties to the ground forces. In fact in 
early July both commands were in despair; 
the Allies because of the slowness of their 
advance and the unexpectedly high infantry 
8
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Mitchell medium bombers from 2 Group, Second Tactical Air Force on a mission over France prior to D-Day. 
(NAC PA 115106) 
casualties, and the Germans because they 
recognized that the line in Normandy was 
extremely fragile and that once it had broken 
all of France and Belgium would have to be 
abandoned. 
The Allied response to the stalemate 
that seemed to be developing in the first 
weeks of July was to make even greater 
demands on the Allied air forces. The Germans 
could not draw on the same degree of support 
from the Luftwaffe. The use of the heavy 
bombers at Caen, "Goodwood" and "Cobra," 
opens a whole new series of questions about 
the efficacy ofthese machines in close support 
roles. Here it needs only to be said that again 
there is a good deal of controversy about 
whether they made the break-out possible or 
not. That they helped cannot be seriously 
questioned. Every German vehicle destroyed, 
every position made harmless, was surely a 
bonus to the advancing infantry and tanks. 
Nevertheless the ground had to be won and it 
was won the hard way by the ground forces. 
There were no "magic" solutions. 
What may be even more difficult to 
assess than the material damage done by air 
power was the effect on the morale of the 
German Army. The evidence on how individual 
units or soldiers reacted tends to be anecdotal 
and in some respects unreliable. It made 
relatively little difference to the advancing 
Allied troops if German machine-gunners were 
unhappy while firing their weapons. It was 
only when whole units broke as a result of air 
attacks that one could argue that bombing 
had destroyed the morale of the German 
forces and that happened too rarely to be 
taken as a serious factor in the Allied victory. 
The effect on the German commanders may 
well be a different matter. Nearly all of them 
emphasize the importance of the 
overwhelming weight of the air forces in 
bringing victory to the Allies in Normandy. 
Such an assessment may very well be true 
but it must also be remembered that the air 
forces were one of the elements over which 
the German generals had no control, so that 
they could well argue that the loss of the 
battle was not their fault but rather that of 
45 
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the Luftwaffe; they also knew that many of 
the Allied interrogators shared this view and 
naturally gave at least some of the answers 
which seemed to be expected. On the other 
hand, there can surely be no doubt that they 
felt terribly helpless in the face of the complete 
Allied control of the sky. This was a situation 
which only rarely existed on the Russian 
front even in 1944 and certainly the German 
Army had won its more spectacular campaigns 
in the early part of the war at a time when it 
was the Luftwaffe which had dominated the 
skies. 
Perhaps the only answer to the question 
raised here is that one cannot attribute the 
victory to any specific branch of the Allied 
services. The Allies hoped for a quick victory 
and, despite their experience in Italy, they 
believed that it was possible to win such a 
victory with the minimum of infantry 
casualties because of what tanks and aircraft 
were supposed to accomplish. They became 
extremely worried in June and July when 
infantry casualties mounted alarmingly 
without any large territorial gains: it looked 
briefly as if a major battle of attrition would 
develop in Normandy, similar to those fought 
in the 1914-1918 war. That could be 
construed as showing the failure of the 
interdiction plan, just as the final break-out 
could be attributed to its success. Both 
assertions are really exaggerations. The 
interdiction plan was of considerable 
importance and helped the Allied cause. It 
did not fully succeed in blocking either 
German reinforcements or German supplies 
but it helped to slow them down. It deprived 
the enemy of much flexibility and initiative. 
In other words it was a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the victory. In the 
final analysis the Allies still had to fight on 
the ground and learn how to beat a stubborn 
and sometimes skilful enemy who remained 
in the field despite everything that the air 
forces accomplished. 
NOTES 
1. "Allied air power was so overwhelming that the defeat of 
Allied intentions on the ground never threatened disas-
ter. only delay, and that only in the early stages, well 
compensated later. But let us be quite clear about it: 
46 
what made ultimate victory possible was crushing air 
power. It is not pleasant to contemplate what might 
have happened without it." John Terraine, The Right of 
the Line (London, 1985). p.619. Chester Wilmot, The 
Struggle for Europe had made roughly the same point in 
his 1952 account - p.289. 
2. For example see the Department ofthe Army: Historical 
Section: O.B. West: "Atlantic Wall to Siegfried Line -A 
Study in Command" 5 vols. Written by a large number 
of the German generals who held command positions 
during this period. See particularly Vol.1 Ch.1 - "The 
Decisive Influence of Enemy Air Power": This particular 
set can be found in the National Archives of Canada 
[NAC]. The complete "B" series, 850 separate narratives 
[some very long] written between 1946 and 1948 by the 
German officers, are in OCMH, Washington. 
3. See, for example, Sir John Kennedy, The Business of 
War, (London, 1957). "As it tumed out, it would not 
have mattered if we had not dropped a single bomb 
before Overlord with the object of checking German 
military movement." p.325 
4. Details of the effect of bombing of individual installa-
tions may be found in weekly reports of Army Group 
"B", "Fliegerangriffe und ihre Auswirkungen im Bereich 
W.B. NiederlandeundA.O.K. 15, Mai,Juni,Juli 1944." 
See Microfilm Records of Germany Army: T 311/3. I am 
grateful to my Research Assistant, Mr. Ralph Guentzel, 
who carefully listed virtually every incident as de-
scribed in the above named document, as well as 
examining many other microfilm reels in connection 
with a larger project on the effects of Allied bombing 
policy prior to and during the Overlord operation. 
5. The question of whether bombing could seriously dis-
rupt such a dense railway network as the French one 
was the subject of intense debate in which the reluc-
tance of the Strategic Air Forces to divert their heavy 
bombers from the offensive against German industry 
played a significant role. The literature on this subject 
is virtually limitless. The debate may be followed in the 
documents, particularly Public Record Office [PRO] AIR 
37 I 514; there are good summaries in Lord Tedder, With 
Prejudice, Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The 
Strategic Air Offensive against Gennany, 1939-1945, 
Vol.III pp.10-42, and in all the other official histories: 
L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol.I and Gordon A. 
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch.VI. Also of consid-
erable importance are Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to 
Warlords, Chs.12 & 13 and E. Kingston-McCloughry, 
The Direction of War, Ch.VIII. but the list is really 
endless. 
6. D. Ose, "Entscheidung im Westen, 1944" Deutsche 
Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1982, p.112. This despite 
the fact that Jodl had recommended as early as June 
13th that the risks of a second landing on other fronts 
should now be accepted- see Harrison, Cross-Channel 
Attack, p.412 - Rommel refused to listen to Jodi's 
advice. For a different version see Warlimont, Inside 
Hitler's Headquarters, pp.429-430. 
7. A list of troop-trains maybe found in the 15th appendix 
of the Seventh Army's Quartermaster's War Diary. For 
example the Combat Group of the 275th Infantry 
Division was moved with 14 trains between the 7th and 
8th June; there were 6 trains for the Combat Group of 
the 265th Division. See T 312/1571. 
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8. Movements and orders for movements may be found in 
the War Diary of the Seventh Army, T 312/1568. See 
especially entry for 7 June which includes the report of 
the arrival at the Army boundary of the forward units of 
the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. 
9. Panzer Operations 6th-8th June, Panzer Lehr & 12th 
SS, Bayerlin and Kramer Ms B 814, [NAC] 
10. Meyer, H. "Kriegsgeschichteder 12 S.S. Panzerdivision" 
Vol I- pp.72-85: Osnabruck 1982: The war diaries of 
the Canadian division confirms this first, famous and 
bloody encounter between these two divisions. 
11. Special Interrogation Report [SIR], Lt. -Gen. W. Pickert, 
Commander of the III Flak Corps. p.2 "In a rapid and 
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University and co-author of the Maple Leaf 
Route series, died on April 1st, 1994. He 
will be sorely missed by CMH and its 
readers. 
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